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Efforts are no longer centred on rescheduling and
fresh money actions, but on debt reduction and debt
service reduction, i.e. debt relief. This takes account of
the changed perception of the problem's structure and
of the fact that a solvency crisis cannot be overcome by
making the insolvency criteria, i.e. the debt burdens,
even heavier. This insight represents a hope-inspiring
breakthrough towards a new type of solution after a
long period in which, for quite understandable
reasons, it was taboo even to think of debt relief as a
possible strategy.
But the question arises as to whether a strategy which
is more likely to produce a solution can now be
developed and realised on this new basis. The risk that
this will again not succeed, despite the more realistic
conceptual approach, is obvious.
The banks are now called upon to embrace the basic
objectives of the Brady initiative and proceed with
their implementation. For this to happen, however,
generally valid positions will have to be formulated
which allow scope for tailored refinements in specific
cases and concrete measures within a broader range of
options. Quick and resolute action is imperative.
What is to be done? One can hardly ignore the weakest
link in the chain because that would mean waiving the
indispensable solidarity of creditors.
But one may ask whether these links do have to
subsist. The answer to this is: no. Two of them are, as it
were, 'amenable' to reshaping, i.e. surmountable to a
degree conducive to solving the problem. These two
are the connected scenarios of the creditor banks and
their governments and supervisory authorities. The
differences within these scenarios can be eliminated by
decisions on the part of those involved; they can be
'levelled'. The result of this would be that all links in
the chain on the creditor side would become equally
strong in terms of the described criteria, and a
'common denominator' would be possible, which, in
terms of quality and quantity, would be adequate to
the debt problem and thus this time - at least on the
side of the lenders - bring a solution within reach.
This common denominator should be structurally
uncomplicated and take effect quickly. It should be
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expressed in a general offer from the creditor banks,
supported, i.e. made possible, by 'their' governments
and supervisory authorities and be available to all
debtors who 'qualify' for it.
Which debtor countries 'qualify' in this sense would
have to be decided by the Bretton Woods institutions,
i.e. World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
They would have to examine very closely what
economic policy means the debtor governments
intend to use to solve their economic and political
problems, i.e. overcome their insolvency crisis, and
thus practise effectively and on a lasting basis the
'self-help' that is to be shored up by the help of the
creditors. Conditionality ii'ould remain indispensable as
the basis for any accommodation by lenders, its
fulfilment would be the decisive contribution to solving
the debt problem! Conditions would have to be defined
on a case-by-case basis, and their implementation, as
agreed, monitored by the Fund and the World Bank.
So there are two things that debtors must do: develop
and put forward an adequate economic programme
and implement it with resolve. This complex cannot be
dismantled. It can only be surmounted through the
application of efficient economic policy measures; it
must be 'worked off' - using the resources released as
a result of the bank creditors' offer.
What form could such an offer take? It should consist





It should also envisage a series of phases, i.e. be given a
sequential structure, in order to allow adequate
monitoring.
The negotiation basis could be as follows:
1. During a five-year period, the interest rate on
original indebtedness will be reduced in stages to e.g.
70 per cent, 60 per cent, 50 per cent of its present level
(with the exception of specified obligations, such as
short-term trade financings). During these five years,
the creditor banks - where they have not already
done so - will create tax-deductible provisions in
respect of their capital claims in the amount of up to
50 per cent. Provisions already created by some banks
in excess of this rate will, of course, remain unaffected
by this.
After five years, interest rates will be restored to the
then prevailing market level in order to bring the
debtors back into the normal international interest
rate context. At this juncture, capital claims
representing original indebtedness will - always
assuming that conditionality has been complied with
- be reduced, either immediately or in stages, to e.g.
70 per cent, 60 per cent, 50 per cent, as relief and with
recourse to the provisions which have meanwhile been
accumulated.
The maturity of loans outstanding at the start of
such a scheme will be fixed generally at 25 or 30 years,
with a grace period of five to seven years.
Creditor banks which feel that they are currently
unable to participate in such an offer will basically
have the option of contributing by means of new
money. Apart from recycling interest payments, such
banks will also enjoy a variety of other options.
In addition, agreements with debtors should include
the following features:
- An option to issue convertible bonds in currencies
other than the US Dollar.
- Betterment clauses which would take effect in the
event of a particularly favourable development in a
debtor country's external economy (due to factors
like the price of oil or the level of interest rates).
'Claw-back' clauses which would take effect in the
event of non-compliance with conditionality.
'The material effects of debt relief of between 10 per cent
and 50 per cent for 15 highly indebted countries show
that the arrangement I have described would put the
countries concerned in a position to switch a
considerable volume of resources so far earmarked for
debt service purposes to areas which would help put
their domestic economies back on a healthy footing. It
has been pointed out repeatedly in the debt debate that
the borrowing countries need money for their ongoing
development. It would be more correct to say: they
need resources. Because what they do flot need under
any circumstances is new debt; the simple reference to
the need for money fails to make this critical
distinction. The changed allocation of resources,
made possible by this offer from the creditors, could
be of great assistance: the biggest debtors' 'savings'
may be larger in the first five-year period than the fresh
money injections they have so far requested. They will
obtain net resources for therapies that will support
economic recovery. Here, the debtor countries have
the special responsibility to correct the distortions
which have arisen in production and debt as a result of
excessive weight given to their public sectors.
Debt/equity swaps, privatisations and further
measures to strengthen the private sector should
therefore remain important elements of the still valid
menu approach.
The international creditor banks' offer, the basic
structure of which is outlined above, presupposes, ifit
is to materialise, that the responsible state authorities
make it possible. By means of appropriate fiscal and
accounting legislation, they must harmonise the
starting situations of the banks involved with respect
to the debt problem. This means in concrete terms:
firstly - the provisioning required under the offer
described must be tax-deductible, i.e. eligible for
deduction from taxable income. Secondly - these
provisions must be accorded the status of a provision
suigeneris in that capital resources remain unimpaired
in the year they are utilised.
Over and above that, a further arrangement could be
examined: such generous 'help towards self-help' by
the creditor banks raises questions in two directions
- forwards (into the future) and backwards (into the
past). As far as the future development is concerned, it
probably has to be assumed that any further capital
requirements Ofl the part of debtor countries can no
longer be met in the foreseeable future, with
assumption of the full credit risk, by the banks which
now participate in the debt relief scheme. Here, the
Bretton Woods institutions and/or the governments
of the industrialised nations would have to provide the
funds required. At best, the banks would sustain their
engagement in short-term trade financing, project
finance and co-financing.
As far as the past is concerned, the banks face the
question as to the value at which they should report in
their balance sheets claims remaining after possibly
granting partial debt relief. In principle, of course,
their value depends on the creditworthiness of the
debtors. But as this creditworthiness does not exist at
the present time and the actual purpose of the
approach described is to initiate its restoration, there
will still be a risk for some time, a risk which the banks
should take account of at their own discretion by
creating provisions. Appropriate guarantee commit-
ments from creditor governments (credit enhancement)
could cover this risk for as long and insofar as the
creditworthiness of the debtors has not been restored.
One can therefore establish that:
A debt service and repayment relief offer would be
in keeping with the insolvency character of the debt
crisis.
Such a general offer on the part of the creditor
banks would put their involvement on an equal
footing.
A conditio sine qua non would be the creation of
appropriate tax and regulatory regimes by the
governments and supervisory authorities responsible
for the creditor banks. This would then harmonise
banks' starting positions.
The Bretton Woods institutions and/or the
governments of the industrialised nations would have
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to meet any further capital requirements on the part of
debtor countries (with exceptions such as short-term
trade financing), as long as market forces, including
autonomous movements of private capital belonging
to the countries themselves, do not begin to work.
5. The residual claims of the banks could be secured
by credit enhancement.
Assuming this overall scenario, the future problem
structure of the international debt crisis will be
concentrated on the following criteria:
The help towards self-help' from the banks involved
would take effect in the form of interest rate reduction
immediately after the World Bank and the Fund
confirm qualification. With regard to the relief on
principal foreseen for later on, the banks will have
enough time to take the necessary balance sheet
measures.
There still remains the debtor's duty to qualify, i.e.
precisely those problems which form the actual core of
the crisis are still there. In the discussions which will
have to take place between Fund and World Bank on
the one side and borrowers on the other, the subject of
negotiation will no longer be debt, but economics, i.e.
the only field that can eventually give us a once-and-
for-all solution to the debt crisis: the right economic
policy strategies! They cannot be superseded, but only
supported - here and there perhaps made possible in
the first place - by 'accommodative action' on the
part of the banks. But if such policies are not
successfully established and implemented, there will
be no solution! This fact places a heavy burden of
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responsibility on the negotiating partners involved. At
the World Bank and the Fund, this will lead to what is
virtually a standing international economic conference,
the results of which will decide the fates of entire
countries.
The creditor governments, for their part, should
clearly recognise the geopolitical relevance of the new
phase of the debt crisis and accept it by assuming an
obligation of their own. The distribution of roles, to be
understood in appropriate dimensions, between banks
and governments transcends 'burden-sharing' - i.e.
support of the Bretton Woods institutions, adjustments
in the banks' legal/tax environment, generous
reschedulings by the Paris Club and a flexible policy
on the part of national export credit insurers - and
must have qualitative and political substance. In view
of the urgency of finding an effective solution this
time, reproaches such as 'bailing out the banks' are
inappropriate. They are incorrect anyway. If it is
argued that by participating in the losses incurred by
the banks, the state is thereby putting some of the
burden of these losses on society as a whole, then one
should be fair and admit that society as a whole also
continually benefits from banks' profits, because the
state is always, unavoidably and rightly so, one of the
main recipients of a portion of these profits through
income taxes. It is the typical characteristic of a
balanced taxation system that good and bad are
shared: profits and losses. The socialisation of
negative company results corresponds to the sociali-
sation of positive results.
